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Harold H. Bruff * 
How can presidential power aid the effective engagement of scien-
tific or other expertise in the federal bureaucracy with a democratic 
process of policymaking?  This enduring question has high salience 
today.1  Given the myriad problems facing the United States and the 
priorities of the Obama administration, we are already seeing new 
regulatory initiatives that rest on fact and policy judgments to which 
many disciplines can contribute, for example the climate sciences, 
biology, engineering, and economics.  Nevertheless, the critical 
judgments underlying new regulations will involve policy choices that 
must receive the support of political officers and the people them-
selves to be effective. 
A prominent recent Supreme Court case raised several issues con-
cerning this topic.  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the State sued to force the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate emissions of 
greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide) from new motor vehicles.2  
Massachusetts claimed that climate change caused by the gases would 
have various deleterious effects.  The Clean Air Act provides that the 
EPA Administrator “shall by regulation prescribe” standards to con-
trol air pollutants from new motor vehicles “which in his judgment 
cause” pollution “which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.”3  Under the administration of George W. 
Bush, the EPA had declined to regulate these gases for two reasons.  
The Administrator first argued, contrary to a position taken during 
the Clinton administration, that the EPA lacked jurisdiction to ad-
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 1 For a discussion of the relationship between science and the law, see generally DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY:  THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999); STEVEN 
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dress climate change, because Congress had not intended to delegate 
this power to the Agency.  Second, he argued that it would be unwise 
to regulate, because the cause and effect relationship between the 
gases and climate change had not been sufficiently established and 
because action by the EPA would conflict with the President’s “com-
prehensive approach” to the problem.  (That approach involved sup-
port for technological innovation, voluntary reduction programs, and 
further research, together with diplomatic efforts to persuade devel-
oping countries to reduce their emissions.)4 
Before Massachusetts, the EPA’s recitals would ordinarily have suf-
ficed to prevent reviewing courts from forcing it to take any action.  
The Supreme Court had held that agency decisions not to take en-
forcement action were “presumptively unreviewable” because such 
decisions involve broad priority-setting considerations that courts are 
ill-suited to supervise.5  Nevertheless, in a 5-4 decision written by Jus-
tice Stevens, the Court pressed forward.  It rather unpersuasively dis-
tinguished the denial of a petition for rulemaking in this case from 
other kinds of nonenforcement decisions.  Proceeding to the merits, 
it held that EPA did have jurisdiction over greenhouse gases.  The 
Court then concluded that EPA’s decision not to regulate was “arbi-
trary” and “capricious” under the familiar formulation of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.6  Disparaging EPA’s justifications as “a laun-
dry list of reasons not to regulate,” the Court ordered EPA to 
reconsider whether greenhouse gases endanger public health or wel-
fare by contributing to climate change, and to “ground its reasons for 
action or inaction in the statute.”7 
The Court’s unusually aggressive supervision of EPA in Massachu-
setts seems to be due to the majority’s belief that the agency was ignor-
ing its own scientific record, which pointed strongly in favor of regu-
lation, in favor of presidential policies that did not directly answer the 
statutory command.  Justice Stevens cited scientific studies such as 
those issued by the United Nations’s prestigious Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change for the conclusion that there was indeed 
every reason to believe that greenhouse gases accelerate climate 
change.8  There was no visible deference to President Bush’s conclu-
 
 4 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 512–13. 
 5 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
 6 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534.  The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A), incorpo-
rates the Administrative Procedure Act’s standard for reviewing rulemaking, which is in 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 7 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533, 535. 
 8 Id. at 507–09. 
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sions as reported by EPA.  In essence, the Court was willing to prod 
the EPA to regulate based on its own view of the science of climate 
change, whatever the President might think.  The Court never explic-
itly claimed that it was better situated than the President to make 
such a judgment, but its holding certainly implied such a view. 
Unfortunately for the Court’s intentions, it is one thing to order 
administrative action, and another to obtain it.  (Knowledge of that 
difficulty is one reason courts are reluctant to require affirmative 
agency action.)  For the nearly two years left in the Bush administra-
tion after Massachusetts, the EPA stalled until the clock ran out.  It did 
not do so without some internal tensions, however.9  In 2008, EPA 
Administrator Stephen Johnson again declined to regulate green-
house gases, explaining that existing statutes were “ill-suited” to the 
task.10  His conclusion appeared as a preface to a report by EPA’s staff 
that actually supported regulation:  he “was simultaneously publish-
ing the policy analysis of his scientific and legal experts and repudiat-
ing its conclusions.”11  Obviously, the controlling opinion was that of 
President George W. Bush. 
In his initial days in office, President Barack Obama promised to 
review the greenhouse gas issue and to act promptly as the facts war-
ranted.  It soon became clear that scientific analysis would be promi-
nent in the new administration, and that a sense of urgency about 
addressing climate change would be present as well.  Days after the 
inauguration, Obama’s new EPA administrator, Lisa Jackson, in-
structed EPA’s staff that “[s]cience must be the backbone for EPA 
programs.”12  The metaphor was apt—as I will discuss, scientific ex-
pertise can provide a framework for regulation, but policy fleshes it 
out.  By April, she was ready to propose for public comment the en-
dangerment finding that will trigger a new rulemaking for auto emis-
sions, saying that the supporting science “compelling[ly]” supports 
the finding.13  In June, the administration issued a general climate 
 
 9 See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger:  Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agen-
cy Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1143 (2008) (describing the EPA’s review of 
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 10 Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 
30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 11 Felicity Barringer, 2 Decisions Shut Door on Bush Clean-Air Steps, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at 
A1. 
 12 Memorandum from Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, to EPA Employees (Jan. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/Administrator/memotoemployees.html. 
 13 Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,904 (Apr. 24, 2009) (to be 
condified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1); see EPA, Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
Findings for Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act (Oct. 4, 2009), 
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change report, concluding that harms from global warming are al-
ready present and are worsening.14  A change of presidential admini-
strations had produced a reversal of regulatory policy. 
In the controversy over auto emissions, a President’s powers to 
spur an agency forward or to hold it back had dramatic effect, as has 
judicial willingness to supervise and overturn agency conclusions of 
scientific fact and policy even when they obviously reflect presidential 
priorities.  From a separation of powers standpoint, the absent player 
has been Congress, which has not amended the Clean Air Act to clar-
ify whether and how EPA should address climate change.  The con-
troversy also demonstrated the fact that although judicial interven-
tion can alter the policy landscape, the courts cannot actually form 
and implement new policy—only the two political branches can do 
that. 
For the President, the greenhouse gas controversy poses a chal-
lenge:  how can he use his constitutional powers to implement his 
own priorities in ways that fit the available scientific evidence and the 
existing statutes well enough to be safe from judicial overruling?  
Substantial legal uncertainty surrounds this question.  After more 
than two centuries under our government, the President’s supervi-
sory powers over the branch that he heads remain murky, because 
the Constitution says so little about statutory administration.  Fortu-
nately, Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo have provided us an ex-
cellent historical treatment of the supervisory powers in The Unitary 
Executive.  The book reveals a rich interplay between Presidents and 
Congress as the two political branches employ constitutional argu-
ments as weapons in the contest for custody of their unruly offspring, 
the administrative agencies. 
I write to argue that effective presidential management of federal 
regulation can occur without resort to the high stakes of constitu-
tional dispute.  Instead, the few constitutional rules that mark the 
boundaries of this field leave ample room for the development of po-
litical solutions to twenty-first century problems.  With some adjust-
ments that I will suggest, the subconstitutional techniques of adminis-
trative law can do the necessary work of providing a legal framework 
for the interaction of politics with science. 
 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html; see also John M. Broder, E.P.A. 
Clears Path to Regulate Heat-Trapping Gases for First Time in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 
2009, at A15. 
 14 GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 
2009), available at http://www.globalchange.gov/usimpacts. 
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Any analysis of the intersection of expertise with regulation must 
begin with recognition that both of these terms are shorthand for 
very diverse and complex realities.  Scientific techniques and cultures 
differ along lines of emphasis on theory (physics), experimentation 
(geology, biology), environmental application (engineering, mathe-
matics), or social application (economics).  Of course, any given dis-
cipline can mix these approaches.  Just as kinds of expertise differ, so 
do agencies. Single-headed cabinet departments differ from each 
other and from the multi-member independent agencies.  In addi-
tion, both scientists and regulators confront various outside influ-
ences.  Scientists live in complex professional webs; regulators in 
complex governmental ones.  Still, since analysis must begin some-
where, I will outline the worlds of the regulator and the scientist, fo-
cusing on the intersections between them that administrative law pa-
trols. 
I.  THE EVOLVING ROLE OF EXPERTISE IN THE BUREAUCRACY 
Views of the role of expertise in government have gone through 
several stages in our history.15  I will sketch the pattern in broad 
strokes.  At first, all seemed simple.  Andrew Jackson was famous for 
asserting that government needed no experts.16  In Jacksonian Amer-
ica, when most federal employees were part-time customs or postal 
officers, his belief that anyone having normal gifts and good charac-
ter could be a bureaucrat rang true.  By the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, the Industrial Revolution had transformed the nation.  
Now the government took on complex tasks such as setting railroad 
rates and assuring the purity of food and drugs.  An intellectual trans-
formation occurred as well.  The Progressive movement settled on 
the notion of expertise as the answer to many of the difficulties at-
tending new kinds of government functions.  Regulation would be 
performed by neutral experts in service of a unitary public interest.  
 
 15 For full exploration of the stages described in the text of this section, see generally 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.7 (4th ed. 2002); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2007); Ro-
bert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986); Ri-
chard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 
(1975).  For an analysis of the modern situation, see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE 
VICIOUS CIRCLE:  TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993). 
 16 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”:  Administrative Law from Jackson to 
Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1614 (2008) (quoting Jackson’s annual message 
to Congress in which he stated, “I can not but believe that more is lost by the long con-
tinuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience”). 
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Unfortunately, this view was unstable because it posited a clean sepa-
ration between expertise and politics that has never existed. 
Just after another great pulse of regulation in the New Deal, the 
legal realists exploded the notion of apolitical expertise.  After World 
War II, a new conception of administrative law arose to replace the 
faded Progressive vision.  Now interest group pluralism would ap-
proximate the Madisonian machine for deriving a public interest 
from the clash of factions.17  No one had decided, however, who 
should run that machine, and how it should be done. 
These uncertainties became acute as regulation surged again in 
the 1970s with the creation of ambitious new fields of health and safe-
ty regulation.  Before very long, each of the three federal branches 
asserted a distinct constitutional role in regulating the regulators.  
However, the decentralized nature of each of the branches prevented 
the formulation of consistent and coherent instructions to the regula-
tory agencies, which struggled as best they could to respond to the 
mixed signals they were receiving, while attempting to solve policy 
puzzles at the same time.18 
Congress took the initial lead by enacting statutes that spurred the 
agencies forward to protect the public.  Substantive statutory com-
mands defining the new programs heightened the need for reliable 
scientific judgment and the need to define the relationship of exper-
tise with policymaking.  As Congress tinkered with the statutes over 
the years, it often added substantive complexity to policymaking by 
driving the agencies in directions that were not compatible with an 
understandable initial instruction to protect the public effectively.19  
Congress also proliferated administrative process in an attempt to 
manage the clash of private interests in search of the pluralist ideal.  
(Procedural reform is a frequent refuge of those disquieted about 
policy but unable to state better policy directly.)  Added process 
opened agencies to more diverse outside influences, at the cost of 
slowing policymaking and making it more expensive. 
Unfortunately, the internal organization of Congress fostered a 
gap between the substantive promises of the statutes and the agen-
cies’ capacity to carry them out.  Congressional appropriations take 
 
 17 The pluralist view is derived from the argument of The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison). 
 18 For an overview of the structure of the three branches, see HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE 
OF FORCES:  SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 33–55 (2006). 
 19 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and Engineering:  In Search of the Law-Science Problem, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 135 (2003) (analyzing the “problems of integrating science and 
scientists into law and legal processes” by examining the applied science of engineering 
in the context of health and safety regulation). 
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place in a different set of committees from the substantive authoriza-
tions, with no mechanism to force coordination between them.  Be-
ginning in the 1980s, budget cuts undermined agency perform-
ance—to such an extent that it is now common to refer to the 
regulatory agencies as examples of “Hollow Government.”20  Exacer-
bating the agencies’ practical difficulties is the uncoordinated nature 
of informal congressional oversight of regulatory performance, oc-
curring as it does in multiple authorizing and appropriating sub-
committees in both houses of Congress.21 
As agencies promulgated new regulations in the 1970s, court chal-
lenges brought the federal courts into the fray.  Able judges in the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, where much administrative litigation 
centers, searched for ways to test claims of agency expertise against 
both the wiles of lawyers who challenged the regulations and the crit-
ical insights that the judges themselves could bring to bear.22  The 
court ensured that studies and data assembled by experts were ex-
posed to public scrutiny and testing during the comment period for 
new rules.  It also required agencies to respond to salient comments 
on this material and to comprehensively explain their resolution of 
issues of scientific fact and policy.  Eventually, the court evolved an 
intrusive style of review that required the agencies to take a “hard 
look” at the substantive problems before them and that added new, 
judicially crafted administrative procedures to ensure fair treatment 
of affected interests.23 
The Supreme Court intervened episodically to change the rules of 
the game, but not in a wholly consistent fashion.  Sometimes the 
Court tried to preserve agency discretion.  In Vermont Yankee, the 
Court upheld administrative procedural discretion by forbidding re-
viewing courts to impose procedures not required by statute.24  In 
Chevron, the Court increased administrative discretion to decide is-
sues of law by requiring reviewing courts to accept statutory interpre-
tations by agencies if they did not contravene clear statutory com-
 
 20 Mark L. Goldstein, Hollow Government, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Oct. 1989, at 12, 12–13. 
 21 For a full exploration of the myriad ways by which Congress influences law administra-
tion, see Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006). 
 22 The most prominent case is Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
 23 PIERCE, supra note 15, § 7.4. 
 24 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 
(1978); see generally Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court’s Role in the Nuclear En-
ergy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978) (applauding the Supreme Court’s reluc-
tance to confine agency procedure in science policy decisions). 
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mands and were otherwise reasonable.25  Chevron explicitly approved 
the kind of election-driven change of statutory interpretation that 
later occurred in the wake of Massachusetts. 
Sometimes, however, the Court reduced administrative discretion, 
as in its State Farm decision endorsing strict hard look review of agen-
cy decisions of fact and policy.26  The State Farm definition of the 
scope of review can be interpreted to contemplate an appropriate 
level of judicial restraint.  It calls for a reviewing court to overturn 
agency action for arbitrariness “if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, 
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.”27  Some federal courts, how-
ever, treated State Farm as a license to engage in very intrusive review.  
The Massachusetts decision epitomizes this version of the hard look 
style of review. 
The thirteen courts of appeals have struggled to execute these var-
ious directives from the Supreme Court faithfully.  They cannot do so 
with entire consistency, however, for the very reason that there are 
thirteen of them, each of which divides into a much larger number of 
panels of three to decide particular cases.28  The resulting set of 
commands to any agency is incoherent.  The agencies suffer most 
when hard look review of substantive policy decisions asks for “an un-
achievable level of scientific certainty,” a frequent enough result 
when generalist judges review specialized administrative records.29 
The Supreme Court should take an early opportunity to confine 
the broad substantive implications of Massachusetts.  It would be 
enough to call for adherence to the State Farm test as originally stated, 
 
 25 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see generally 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath:  Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of 
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988) (arguing that Chevron maximized politi-
cally accountable presidential oversight of agencies). 
 26 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); see gener-
ally Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177 (read-
ing State Farm to endorse the doctrine). 
 27 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 28 See Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
1193 (1992) (detailing the problematic effects of decentralized appellate courts reviewing 
the behavior of centralized administrative agencies); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty 
Cases per Year:  Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105–06 (1987) (exploring the implications of ju-
dicial decentralization). 
 29 JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 91 (1990). 
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not as sometimes applied.  The important point is to allow agencies 
to form policy within statutory limits, even in the presence of substan-
tial conflict and uncertainty in the scientific record.30  In other words, 
courts should give agencies the same kind of latitude in reaching fact 
and policy judgments as they do regarding statutory interpretation 
under Chevron. 
Unhappily, there is a reason for variations in the stringency of ju-
dicial review that casts little credit on the federal judiciary.  Empirical 
studies have shown a dismaying correlation between the judges’ ori-
entation toward regulation and the politics of the President who ap-
pointed them.31  Again, Massachusetts is an example.  The solution for 
this problem is simple—an appropriate level of judicial restraint—but 
hard to achieve.32  Certainly, it would be in the enlightened self-
interest of the judiciary to show more restraint, lest political retribu-
tion against the judges arise.33 
In the 1970s, Presidents began taking an active role in managing 
regulation.34  To the extent that this effort is effective, it gives the ex-
ecutive branch a good argument to counter activist judicial review:  
that agency policy reflects participation by the elected chief execu-
tive.  The earliest initiative, and still the most prominent technique, 
 
 30 For critiques of State Farm, see CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  
RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 183 (1990) (stating that State Farm “en-
tails a conception of politics as distinguishable from and in opposition to the required ra-
tionality of agency decision making”); accord Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers 
to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 307 n.191 (2006) (noting the difficulties of 
determining the basis for an agency’s actions because after State Farm, agencies do not 
declare that the reason for their action is a change in administration). 
 31 See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008) (finding political commitments significantly influence the opera-
tion of hard look review in EPA and NLRB cases); Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influ-
ence on Judicial Behavior?  An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. 
Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100 (2001) (revealing strong, statistically significant evidence of 
ideological voting in the D.C. Circuit’s review of the health-and-safety decisions of twenty 
federal agencies between 1970 and 1996); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (concluding that “ideology 
significantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit”); Cass R. Sunstein, et 
al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals:  A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 
301 (2004) (confirming through aggregate data that the political party of the appointing 
President is a fairly good predictor of how individual judges will vote). 
 32 Neither liberal activists nor conservative activists among the judges are likely to desist vol-
untarily, in part because that would leave the field to their opponents.  In game theory, 
this is a prisoner’s dilemma. 
 33 Although Congress is not likely to impeach activist judges, it can deny requests for added 
salary or resources, or limit the courts’ jurisdiction.  Presidents, unfortunately, have an 
incentive to counter past nominations of activists by the other party with activists of their 
own. 
 34 I discuss this presidential role infra Part V. 
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has been a series of executive orders that have required agencies to 
analyze their proposals carefully and to endure extensive consultation 
and jawboning from the President’s own bureaucrats in his Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB).  These executive orders have im-
posed a layer of economic analysis atop the various kinds of expertise 
already present in the administrative records assembled by the agen-
cies.  The differing kinds of expertise have coexisted quite uncom-
fortably. 
Two other kinds of executive branch management of regulation 
have superimposed themselves on the executive order program.  
First, various executive officers, many of them located in one of the 
White House units, have contacted agencies ad hoc to supply their 
views about particular regulations.  Second, President Clinton 
brought to prominence a practice that his successors have continued, 
of direct presidential intervention to spur an agency to take a particu-
lar policy initiative.35  These three kinds of supervision are not likely 
to be wholly consistent.  Consequently, from the standpoint of an 
agency, even the executive branch is not unitary in any functional 
sense.  Instead, unless and until the President himself intervenes, var-
ious elements in both the presidential bureaucracy and the wider ex-
ecutive branch can be expected to push the agency hither and yon. 
As the pace of federal regulation slowed markedly under pressure 
from these competing and conflicting commands from all three con-
stitutional branches and from various segments in the private sector, 
many observers lamented the “ossification” of rulemaking.36  Sug-
gested remedies encompass the actions of all three branches:  Con-
gress should streamline both substantive commands and procedural 
requisites and should provide more money; the courts should ease 
substantive review of policy; the executive branch should reduce its 
supervision of particular policy decisions.37  To date, not much has 
happened.  As the millennium arrived, it seemed to many that there 
could be too much distrust of expertise, too much political manipula-
 
 35 There were scattered earlier examples, such as President Reagan’s announcement of an 
effort to aid domestic auto manufacturers, which led directly to the deregulatory effort 
that was overturned in State Farm.  RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 198 (5th 
ed. 2006). 
 36 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386–87 (1992) (noting the “existing evidence of the ossification of in-
formal rulemaking[,] . . . [the] consequences[,] . . . [its] causes[,] . . . [and] various ossi-
fication avoidance devices”). 
 37 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 59 (1995); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking:  Waiting for Ver-
mont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418 (1981). 
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tion of regulatory decisions, and too much judicial intervention.  
Postmodern malaise deepened and has not abated. 
II.  WAYS OF THINKING 
How shall we untangle this snarl?  Let us revert to fundamentals 
by noting some differences between the ways that scientists and regu-
latory policymakers normally think.  That exercise should allow us to 
isolate the real problems in their relationships that government struc-
ture and process must then address. 
Consider a climate scientist, who speaks with direct authority on 
topics that he or she has covered in direct investigation and reported 
in the usual peer-reviewed places.  A fundamental value among scien-
tists is to confine claims to the evidence.  Because professional pun-
ishment awaits unsupported claims, scientists tend to err on the side 
of understatement.  Yet even a distinguished and prolific scientist can 
cover only fragments of a field through direct investigation.  Beyond 
projects performed personally, a scientist possesses a far broader 
range of knowledge acquired through reading papers of students and 
colleagues, attending conferences, and engaging in myriad casual ex-
changes within the discipline.  Strictly speaking, this extended knowl-
edge has not been tested by personal investigation and outside re-
view, but it is real and is very difficult for anyone outside the scientific 
community to acquire, especially quickly. 
A concrete example may be useful.  A colleague of mine who is a 
geochemist in the University of Colorado’s Institute of Arctic and Al-
pine Research has examined many an ice core in Greenland and has 
read widely about the ice caps and the signs that they are melting rap-
idly.  He is a true expert on these matters, with a strong claim to def-
erence from the rest of us.  On the critical question of causation of 
the melting, though, he confesses that he begins to stray from his di-
rect knowledge.  He can note correlations with the rise in global car-
bon dioxide levels and can reasonably conclude that the correlations 
are strong enough to be probative.  Yet others may contest his infer-
ences on the basis of specialized or general knowledge about which 
he has no unique insight.  At this point, our geochemist engages the 
wider community, which is partly composed of other scientists (physi-
cists, statisticians, etc.) and partly of citizens and politicians who must 
decide what to do about climate change. 
When scientists enter the public arena, they encounter temptation 
to abandon professional discipline and engage in “stealth issue advo-
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cacy,” the importing of policy arguments into ostensibly scientific dis-
course.38  Two powerful incentives may combine to produce this be-
havior.  One is passion, the scientist’s devotion to the subject matter 
of his or her career and to convictions developed after much time 
and effort.  The second is employment, the tendency to serve the in-
terests of one’s employer (an agency, a private company’s research 
arm, a think tank with an agenda).  Researchers who are employed by 
universities may be free of these employment-based influences, be-
cause most universities lack an admitted agenda favoring particular 
scientific theories. 
Two additional limitations hamper the contributions of scientists 
to policymaking.  First, because scientific knowledge is specialized, it 
“ordinarily provides too narrow a base for the instrumental judg-
ments that an intelligent policy would require.”39  Thus, the very focus 
that allows scientific inquiry to seek excellence limits its usefulness as 
a guide to broader questions.  Second, policymakers must always be 
wary of conventional wisdom within any field.  Dominant opinion can 
deter needed theoretical innovation.  The familiar notion of “para-
digm shift” holds that dominant theories fend off incremental 
change until they are overthrown entirely.40  For example, in geology, 
theories of continental drift were objects of derision until a series of 
discoveries allowed the theory of plate tectonics to become today’s 
conventional wisdom. 
Alas, it seems that scientists are human.  We cannot simply trust 
but must continuously test them.  Distrust of some scientific analysis 
has reached sufficient levels to produce the derisive term “junk sci-
ence.”  A considerable body of literature—and some court decisions 
and legislation—address and try to forestall reliance on junk sci-
ence.41  Near the end of the Clinton administration, Congress en-
acted two related statutes to address the problem.  First, the Shelby 
Amendment authorized use of the Freedom of Information Act to 
obtain data by publicly funded research studies.42  Second, the Data 
Quality Act required the OMB to issue guidelines to agencies to 
 
 38 ROGER A. PIELKE, JR., THE HONEST BROKER:  MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN POLICY AND 
POLITICS 4 (2007). 
 39 Douglas Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 251, 274 (2010) (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 337 
(1989)). 
 40 The classic discussion is contained within THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
 41 See generally Symposium, supra note 1, at 3 (presenting several articles discussing Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the role of science in judicial decisions). 
 42 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
Feb. 2010] PRESIDENTIAL POWER MEETS BUREAUCRATIC EXPERTISE 473 
 
“maximiz[e] the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity” of informa-
tion they disseminate.43  OMB must also require the creation of “ad-
ministrative mechanisms” to allow affected persons to obtain correc-
tion of agency-held information.  There have been unsuccessful 
attempts to bring litigation over the validity of scientific findings un-
der the Data Quality Act.44  Disputes under the Act should be left 
within the administrative process, and not allowed to furnish a basis 
for judicial review separate from the testing process that already oc-
curs during review of a final agency regulation, lest opportunities to 
stall the policy process be increased. 
These statutes responded to perceptions that agencies have en-
gaged in a “science charade,” in which they exaggerate the role of 
science in supporting regulations that actually depend on policy deci-
sions.45  The statutes may, however, ill fit their ostensible purposes, 
since the underlying problem is not usually that scientific studies are 
bad, but that their findings are used inappropriately to support policy 
conclusions.46  Certainly the statutes have given interests opposed to 
federal regulation a new weapon to contest the bases for proposed 
rules.  This creates the potential to improve the scientific basis for 
regulation, but it adds substantially to the cost and delay in rulemak-
ing processes.47 
The Bush administration also initiated a controversial “peer-
review” process within the Federal Government.48  There were com-
plaints that the process would slow regulation in return for little gain 
in its reliability, considering that most scientific investigation already 
undergoes peer review as it is being generated and that studies held 
by agencies are already tested extensively in the rulemaking process.  
Also, agencies that engage in technical rulemaking have science advi-
 
 43 Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3516(a) (2006); Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763, 2763A-153 to -154 (2000). 
 44 See Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Act did not create a 
legal right to information or its correctness published by the National Heart, Lung and 
Blood Institute). 
 45 For an analysis of the phenomenon, see Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic 
Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995). 
 46 Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction:  Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in 
Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2003) (arguing 
that many administrative reforms using “methodologically unsound” science can “cause 
significant damage to already crippled administrative processes”). 
 47 CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 78–101, 101 (2005) (describing how 
the Bush Administration has tried “to prevent the public from understanding the gravity 
of the climate situation [by] sowing confusion and uncertainty” as to the reliability of sci-
entific research). 
 48 Wagner, supra note 46, at 95–96. 
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sory boards to review and evaluate the information the agency re-
ceives.49 
Regulatory policymakers do not think like scientists and cannot af-
ford to do so.  Time and legislation press them for answers that scien-
tists cannot give.  In the face of uncertainty, a scientist characteristi-
cally wants to perform more studies, in an endless approximation of 
the truth.  Modern statutes, however, are impatient and precaution-
ary.  As in the Massachusetts case, they typically call for regulation of 
risks that “may endanger” the public health and welfare, or a similar 
formulation.50  The statutes try to forestall harm that is not certain to 
occur at all, and that in any event would occur years in the future.  If 
regulation waited until the citizenry suffered clear harm, much pre-
ventable harm would have been incurred and irreversible forces 
might ensure that yet more harm will occur.  Climate change is the 
starkest example of this difficulty. 
The time horizons of regulators are further compressed by the 
practical reality of election cycles.  Election rhythms of two or four 
years leave little room for longer run uncertainties about cause and 
effect in the natural world.  This raises the ultimate question:  “Can 
democracy survive complexity?”51  We cannot tell the answer—it lies 
somewhere beyond the next election cycle. 
The consequence of this regulatory posture is that much modern 
policy is formulated under conditions of substantial or extreme un-
certainty about the scientific facts.  For example, regulation often 
considers prohibiting small doses of a substance that is toxic in high 
doses, but for which the dose-response level is unknown at the levels 
under consideration.52  The overriding question is:  how risk-averse 
should our society be?  Scientists can offer guidance but not answers 
to that question.  Their studies may support inferences of danger, 
and their general knowledge and experience may produce a valuable 
feel for the issues.  At the end of the day, though, the central issue is 
a political value choice, involving as it does major resource commit-
ments from society and major tradeoffs among affected interest 
groups. 
 
 49 See JASANOFF, supra note 1, at 79–83 (describing some of the problems with the regulatory 
peer review process). 
 50 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530 (2007). 
 51 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED:  WHY WE NEED A GREEN REVOLUTION—
AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA 406 (2008) (quoting Stanford climatologist Stephen 
Schneider). 
 52 The standard example is the benzene controversy, litigated in Industrial Union Department, 
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
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A regulator, like a scientist, is not without predictable biases in 
making value choices.  Many career civil servants try to serve the gen-
eral public by achieving their agency’s statutory missions.53  This is 
certainly a laudable trait, but it contains the inherent disadvantage 
that the regulators see and pursue only the limited set of goals that 
their agencies are assigned.  Hence bureaucrats may pursue their sta-
tutory missions at excessive cost to society as a whole.54  That is why all 
three branches oversee the agencies so constantly and suspiciously.  
Hence, the distortion of judgment that attends focusing on particular 
tasks hampers both scientists and regulators, even though their ap-
proach to the problems before them differs in other ways.  If an 
agency’s policymakers disagree with the agency’s scientists (as in the 
wake of Massachusetts), a creative tension results that may foster better 
policy through argument and mutual learning.  If all are in harmony, 
it will be up to outsiders to test the agency’s conclusions to prevent a 
tendency for “groupthink” to produce what we might call “junk regu-
lation.”55 
In this complex mix of fact, inference, policy analysis, and law, the 
boundary between expertise and politics remains indistinct, as it al-
ways has been.  There are, however, better and worse ways of drawing 
the boundary.  Let us turn to the relative contributions of constitu-
tional and administrative law doctrines to the boundary project. 
III.  THE APPOINTMENTS POWER 
I begin with the power of nomination or appointment of officers 
because that is where each new administration begins, and because 
the power to choose those who execute the laws has far greater prac-
tical importance than do powers to direct or remove them.56  (That is, 
 
 53 STEPHEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS:  THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD 
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008).  For an exploration of the gap between aspirational 
views of government service and the reality of life in the civil service, see PAUL C. LIGHT, A 
GOVERNMENT ILL EXECUTED:  THE DECLINE OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE AND HOW TO 
REVERSE IT 131–62 (2008). 
 54 For a study contradicting this conventional wisdom, see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Re-
vesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006). 
 55 The concept of groupthink is from IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK (1972), and 
GROUPTHINK:  PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS (2d ed. 1982); 
see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES:  HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 
(2009) (finding that Democratic and Republican appointees become more partisan in 
their voting patterns when they sit with like-minded individuals). 
 56 For good general treatments of the appointments power, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE 
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS:  A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000); 
DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS:  POLITICAL CONTROL AND 
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2008); and DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS 
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if political appointees are sufficiently attuned to the administration’s 
priorities, a light touch on the reins will guide them.  If not, even the 
spurs may not work.)  The Appointments Clause requires that princi-
pal officers be nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate; inferior officers may be appointed by the President alone, the 
heads of departments, or (sometimes) the courts.57  It is clear that 
Congress may not vest the power to appoint executive officers in it-
self.58  This rule maintains the formal separation between the two 
branches that is required by the Incompatibility Clause because it is 
crucial to fostering the Madisonian competition between them.59 
Notwithstanding this clear constitutional line, Calabresi and Yoo 
demonstrate that throughout our history Presidents have found it ne-
cessary to wrestle with Congress (and especially the Senate) for prac-
tical control of the appointments power.  It turns out that the Sen-
ate’s check of confirming principal officers soon tended to grow into 
a power to tell Presidents whom to nominate.  Senatorial capture of 
the nomination power is most notorious concerning judges in the 
lower federal courts.  That loss of power indirectly undermines the 
President’s capacity to execute the laws because of its effects on judi-
cial review of regulations.  To the extent that it blurs the partisanship 
of nominees, however, it is beneficial.  Senatorial capture is less evi-
dent concerning officers in the President’s cabinet, who are generally 
regarded as his to select.  Still, the need to satisfy senatorial factions 
whose support is needed for legislation may cause a President to se-
lect a less favored nominee to appease senatorial appetites.  The prac-
tice varies for other federal regulators, depending mostly on whether 
they serve in an independent regulatory commission, in which case 
Congress claims a special right to participate in nomination.  The re-
sult is an executive branch that is far less unitary in its selection than 
Presidents would prefer. 
Not surprisingly, this practical diminution of the President’s ap-
pointments power has led to corrective efforts.  Since 1981, Presi-
dents have pushed successfully to increase both the number and pro-
 
OF AGENCY DESIGN:  POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
BUREAUCRACY, 1946–1997 (2003). 
 57 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 58 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that congressional leaders did not have the 
constitutional power to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission). 
 59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.  This is the Madison of The Federalist No. 51.  See generally Harold H. 
Bruff, The Incompatibility Principle, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 228 (2007) (noting that Madison 
thought it was important to do more than clearly delineate a separation of powers be-
tween branches; members of departments must have “constitutional means and personal 
motives” to keep the branches separate). 
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portion of political appointees in the agencies.60  Equally important, 
White House involvement in selection of administrators has become 
routine.  These changes attempt to promote a more unitary policy 
outlook within the executive, as added layers of the President’s sup-
porters struggle to control the career bureaucracy below them while 
fending off the pressures of oversight by Congress and other outsid-
ers.  The resulting shift of power has been away from congressional or 
party control of patronage and toward presidential selection of per-
sons committed to the President’s own agenda. 
Every gain comes at some cost.  Economists emphasize the univer-
sal presence of “agency costs,” the tendency of any agent (e.g., a cab-
inet head) to diverge from exact implementation of instructions from 
the principal (e.g., the President).  The existence of this “slack” can-
not be eliminated, and adding new layers of subordinates increases it.  
The danger, then, is that what was intended to be a chorus becomes a 
cacophony.  This danger explains why the practice of “thickening” 
the layers of political appointees dismays some public administration 
scholars, who lament the loss of clean, simple lines of command.61  By 
increasing the numbers of political appointees in the executive 
branch, Presidents have also increased their own managerial respon-
sibilities as they try to implement coherent policies.  Ironically, one 
presidential response to this managerial problem is further thicken-
ing to control the expanded apparatus of political appointees.  As I 
will discuss, President Obama immediately appointed several policy 
“czars” to superintend the agencies. 
Centralized supervision of the appointment process can even ex-
tend into the supposedly apolitical realm of bureaucratic experts as 
new agency staff or external advisors can be chosen for their known 
outlook (for example, believers in or debunkers of global warming).  
Conformity of outlook that is shared between politicos and experts 
tends to stifle the dialogue that is necessary for development of sound 
policy.  Thus, political conformity can produce unitary policy, but it 
risks closed-mindedness or even “groupthink.”  The recent Bush ad-
ministration came the closest in memory to turning the cadre of po-
litical appointees into a phalanx of conformists.  Signals that loyalty 
to the stated or presumed priorities of the President took precedence 
over inconvenient facts reduced agency costs and the flow of needed 
information at the same time. 
 
 60 See generally Barron, supra note 9, at 1097 (noting the “politicization of the national bu-
reaucracy”). 
 61 PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT:  FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 61–95 (1995). 
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The Bush administration was justifiably condemned for the efforts 
of political officers to suppress or manipulate judgments of scientists 
or other experts.62  In 2008, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) 
petitioned Congress to protect “scientific freedoms,” including free-
dom “to conduct their work without political or private-sector inter-
ference” and “to candidly communicate their findings to Congress, 
the public, and their scientific peers.”63  The most prominent exam-
ple of the behavior that UCS condemned concerned efforts to muz-
zle a distinguished NASA climate scientist, James Hansen, by a young 
political appointee who possessed far more zeal than judgment or 
knowledge.64  Regardless of whether Hansen is right or wrong, I think 
we should know his views.  Anyone can then respond to them, and no 
one will think Hansen speaks for the administration if a simple dis-
claimer is made.  A change in administrations will not automatically 
cure this problem.  It is perfectly possible to substitute liberal zealots 
for the conservative ones in agency corridors.65 
One simple check on this tendency toward manipulation would 
be to assure that the views of experts in nonpolitical positions are 
freely available to Congress and the public.  Political officers would 
then remain free to disagree with dissenting experts, but they would 
have to do so openly, and the public could judge the debate.  Every-
one understands the need for the political appointees in an admini-
stration to toe the official line, but I think the power to compel con-
formity need not and should not extend to expert staff.  The Obama 
administration made an early and generalized commitment to trans-
parency,66 but has yet to extend the principle to this level of specific-
ity. 
Is the executive branch so constitutionally unitary that it must 
speak with a single voice?  Calabresi and Yoo recount a controversy 
dating from the early Republic about independent executive branch 
 
 62 For criticisms of the Bush administration’s attempts to distort scientific findings, see 
MOONEY, supra note 47; see also SETH SHULMAN, UNDERMINING SCIENCE:  SUPPRESSION AND 
DISTORTION IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006). 
 63 Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008 Statement:  Scientific Freedom and the Public 
Good, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/abuses_of_science/scientific-freedom-
and-the.html.  The petition was signed by more than 15,000 scientists, including over fifty 
Nobel Laureates, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/solutions/big_picture 
_solutions/prominent-statement-signatories.html. 
 64 See generally MARK BOWEN, CENSORING SCIENCE:  INSIDE THE POLITICAL ATTACK ON DR. 
JAMES HANSEN AND THE TRUTH OF GLOBAL WARMING (2008). 
 65 See John M. Broder, Behind the Furor Over a Climate Change Skeptic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
2009, at A19, for a story about claims that a climate change debunker on the EPA staff was 
muzzled by political superiors. 
 66 See Memorandum of January 21, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
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communications with Congress, for example from the Treasury De-
partment.67  This history reveals an episodic pattern of direct com-
munications from executive staff to Congress, accompanied by fairly 
regular assertions by their superiors that it ought to stop.  Modern 
practice dates from 1972, when OMB Circular A-19 called for all ex-
ecutive branch testimony and other direct communications to Con-
gress to be controlled by OMB.68  The Circular has generally been ef-
fective, although members of Congress grumble about it regularly 
and leaks undermine it. 
Recent disputes about direct agency communications with Con-
gress have concerned statutory inspectors general in the agencies, 
who are charged to report misconduct directly to Congress as well as 
to their executive agencies.69  The executive has complained that re-
quiring these direct communications is unconstitutional, but the in-
spectors general remain in place and issue their reports.  From this 
inconclusive history, I do not infer a matured presidential constitu-
tional power to control communications outside the executive 
branch down to the nonpolitical levels.  Moreover, the value of politi-
cal accountability that underlies theories of the unitary executive 
suggests caution about the adoption of constitutional postulates that 
restrict the very flow of information that is needed to make account-
ability real and not merely formal.  For example, the dispute between 
political and professional staff in the EPA that arose in the wake of 
the Massachusetts decision illuminated a controversy about scientific 
fact and policy that the public should have a chance to evaluate. 
Effective policy dialogue requires both an informed speaker and 
an intelligent listener.  From the 1970s to the 1990s, Congress had an 
institutional capacity to receive and evaluate expert advice from the 
agencies and other sources, the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA).70  The OTA provided high quality bipartisan assessments of 
 
 67 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 85 (2008).  This controversy related to important is-
sues about the unitariness of the executive, because it was part of a dispute about separat-
ing the sword and the purse within the executive branch.  Id. at 134. 
 68 Id. at 348.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR NO. A-19 (1979), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars_a019/. 
 69 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978); CALABRESI & 
YOO, supra note 67, at 366–67.  See generally PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT:  
INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993) (examining the role 
of inspectors general and the legal issues surrounding their duties). 
 70 BRUCE BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN CONGRESS:  THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (1996) (examining the relationship between experts 
and elected officials through a study of the interactions between the OTA and Congress). 
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technical policy issues to members of Congress.  It was abolished at 
the behest of Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, who preferred to 
form his own views unguided by anyone (except the ever-present lob-
byists, presumably).71  This was an extremely shortsighted and coun-
terproductive step.  Congress should restore the OTA to help it eva-
luate the myriad scientific policy disputes that will suffuse future 
regulation.  The volume of available materials is simply far too great 
for digestion and evaluation by any single congressional committee 
or its staff. 
IV.  THE REMOVAL POWER 
The President’s constitutional power to remove subordinate ex-
ecutive officers occupies center stage in The Unitary Executive.  In uni-
tary theory, a plenary removal power confirms the President’s core 
powers to select his subordinates and to direct their execution of the 
laws.  The stakes appear to be high, because it may be that only a fully 
unitary executive can form and execute coherent and consistent pol-
icy.  Even an elegant theory, however, must fit the facts, and this one 
does not. 
For four reasons, I do not think a strong unitary theory is either 
necessary or desirable.  First, the executive branch has never been un-
itary in fact, and never will be.  The Washington administration (the 
very model of unitariness in modern nostalgia) contained the warring 
Hamilton and Jefferson, whom an often exasperated Washington 
soothed and managed as best he could.  In modern times, every Pres-
ident still struggles mightily to control his own immediate subordi-
nates, to say nothing about the vast and remote bureaucracy.  The 
practical issue is not whether the President should assure that the ex-
ecutive branch is unitary as a whole, but rather where and how much he 
should try to unify it.  A theory of plenary removal power is overde-
termined as a way to address this issue. 
Second, for good reasons the modern Supreme Court has not ac-
cepted the unitary version of the removal power.  The Court’s cur-
rent test is that removal restrictions are valid unless they “impede the 
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty.”72  Since this test 
just restates the underlying constitutional issue, it is essentially unin-
formative.  Its announcement in a case approving independent pros-
ecutors who might threaten the President’s own continuation in of-
 
 71 MOONEY, supra note 47, at 49–66. 
 72 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988). 
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fice (as one of them later did) suggests that there are few limits to 
congressional restrictions on removal.  I do not favor a minimalist 
view of presidential removal power, for reasons that need not detain 
us.73  It is enough to say that I do perceive good functional reasons for 
restricting plenary presidential removal of members of some of the 
independent regulatory agencies.  For example, Presidents should 
have to justify removal of those who control our money supply (the 
Federal Reserve), or regulate federal elections (the Federal Election 
Commission), or regulate mass communications (the Federal Com-
munications Commission). 
Third, Congress has certainly never accepted a unitary theory of 
presidential removal.  Instead, it has busily legislated various restric-
tions on removal for principal and inferior officers and for employ-
ees.  As Calabresi and Yoo demonstrate, Presidents have regularly ob-
jected to these restrictions for unitary reasons.  But as Calabresi and 
Yoo deny, Presidents have effectively acquiesced in many of them.  
Presidents have signed many statutes containing removal restrictions, 
do not regularly remove members of the independent agencies, and 
are quite cautious about intervening in policymaking by these agen-
cies.  Presidential grumbling about independent administrative func-
tions should not be mistaken for a general declaration of war against 
them, a step that is never in the President’s best interests.  Why not?  
Because every President wants to gather enough political power to 
accomplish his main policy goals, and a retreat on a minor issue of 
removal may allow a broader advance under other statutory powers.  
Warring with Congress on a matter more of principle than of power 
is not a formula for presidential success. 
Fourth, as my last assertion implies, constitutional definitions of 
the removal power simply do not matter very much to the conduct of 
our government.  For the politics of removal often overwhelm consti-
tutional theory.  For decades, Presidents of both parties quailed be-
fore the politically untouchable J. Edgar Hoover, their nominal jun-
ior subordinate.  A cabinet member who has a political base may be 
insulated from removal, whatever the level of presidential irritation 
he or she causes (Hillary Clinton is quite safe).  On the other hand, a 
President may have to relinquish the services of a deeply trusted but 
tarnished subordinate, whatever his reluctance (Alberto Gonzales 
had to go).  Probably the best protected single independent officer of 
all is the Chair of the Federal Reserve, but I do not doubt that if Ben 
Bernanke fails spectacularly enough in attempting to manage the 
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current economic crisis, President Obama could force him from of-
fice. 
These observations about the politics of removal suggest that with-
in limits, Presidents are more likely to tolerate than to remove balky 
or ineffective subordinates.  Threats of dismissal and vigorous purges 
are not preferred supervisory tools for any good manager, especially 
in government.  Firing someone you had earlier selected invites criti-
cism of your own judgment.  In the executive branch, another posi-
tion must often be found for a subordinate who is to be eased out (an 
ambassadorship, perhaps?).  And most important, for any principal 
officer a substitute must be found who can survive confirmation by a 
possibly aroused Senate.  At the least, the replacement process invites 
unwelcome congressional oversight and criticism of the administra-
tion.  It is often better to muddle along. 
For all these reasons, the constitutional power of removal, what-
ever its formal extent, dwells in the shadows of operational govern-
ment.  That does not mean that it is unimportant, however.  Under-
standings about removal do guide analysis of the President’s directive 
power, which is not specified in the Constitution.  At this point statu-
tory relationships between the President and administrators become 
pertinent.  Most regulatory statutes assign responsibility for imple-
mentation to subordinate administrators rather than to the President 
directly.  The relationship between the President and an agency head 
is then derived from the residual removal power.  This approach is 
indirect because the Constitution says so little about statutory admini-
stration. 
There are, however, two pertinent provisions in Article II that im-
ply what I believe is a sound view of the fundamental nature of presi-
dential supervision of administrators.  First, the President’s constitu-
tional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” is 
phrased in the passive, implying strongly that subordinates will do the 
actual implementation of statutes.74  Similarly, the presence of the 
clause allowing the President to “require the Opinion, in writing” of 
agency heads on subjects “relating to the Duties” of their offices im-
plies that when Congress places a statutory decision in the hands of a 
subordinate administrator, that officer and not the President must 
decide, subject of course to presidential oversight.75 
The controversy between President Andrew Jackson and Secretary 
of the Treasury William Duane over removal of federal funds from 
 
 74 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 75 Id. § 2. 
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the Bank of the United States, which Calabresi and Yoo recount in 
detail, is consistent with this relationship.76  Nothing in that episode 
suggests that Jackson thought he could take the statutory decision in-
to his own hands.  Jackson was free, like any President, to specify the 
decision he preferred, and to remove a cabinet officer who could not 
accept that decision.  Jackson made his desire clear, Duane resisted 
on legal grounds, and Jackson fired him.  The senatorial check on 
confirmation of a successor then opened the statutory issues to a 
quite contentious public debate, providing the accountability that is 
at the heart of the thesis advanced by Calabresi and Yoo. 
The Duane episode reveals why the issue of presidential power to 
command administrative decisions has produced so much confusion, 
even within the executive branch.77  Quite simply, the question of a 
constitutional directive power has never been answered by the courts 
because it is never presented to them.  Presidents do not ordinarily 
have to direct their principal subordinates to take particular ac-
tions—a suggestion will do.  The action is then taken and justified in 
the name of the subordinate, masking the President’s influence.78  No 
articulation of constitutional power occurs.  If there is enough resis-
tance to impel a directive, there may be enough to force a removal, as 
Jackson discovered.  Even when there is a removal, the legal effect of 
the President’s initial directive never needs resolution.  The President 
does not execute the statutory action himself; rather, he seeks a re-
placement who will do so.  Once a more compliant officer is con-
firmed (Roger Taney in the bank case), that officer takes responsibil-
ity for the statutory action.  The President remains in the 
background. 
Thus, the President’s power to command subordinate officers, 
like his power to remove them, dwells in the constitutional shadows.  
Unlike the removal power, however, directives are in daily use, albeit 
with enough distance from statutory implementation to leave the ul-
timate constitutional questions unresolved.  Let us turn, then, to the 
ways that Presidents conventionally manage regulatory policymaking. 
 
 76 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 67, at 105–22; for my own, similar version of this episode, 
see BRUFF, supra note 18, at 457–59. 
 77 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 67, at 88–89, reveals the dithering that has occurred. 
 78 The leading case explaining and accepting this relationship is Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 
F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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V.  THE DIRECTIVE POWER 
When federal agencies entered the brave new world of health and 
safety regulation after 1970, Presidents soon realized that the high 
political stakes that were involved merited their attention.  Yet the 
complexity and uncertainty of any given rulemaking frustrated effec-
tive supervision by the relatively small staff in the White House, to say 
nothing of their capacity to oversee the mass of all emerging regula-
tions.  The initial response has remained the dominant one:  Presi-
dents issue executive orders that require agencies to perform cost-
benefit analyses of their regulations and to submit the regulations 
and the analyses to the OMB for a process of review and consulta-
tion.79  President Reagan’s order, issued in 1981, has been the model 
for its successors, which have added detail and altered some empha-
ses within the same basic framework.  Congress has never directly au-
thorized (or forbidden) the program, although it did create the Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB to 
administer it.80  OIRA consists of a professional staff of economists 
and other policy analysts, with a political appointee who is confirmed 
by the Senate at the top.81 
The executive order program is an important tool for Presidents 
to convey their overall regulatory values to the bureaucracy.  Over the 
years, it has become regularized, largely open, and professional in 
tone.  It fosters useful dialogue between agency experts and the Pres-
ident’s staff in OIRA.  Nevertheless, it has important limitations.  It 
prescribes general principles, not particular outcomes; its focus on 
 
 79 The executive order programs have generated a large literature, including some empiri-
cal analyses.  See generally PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS 
LAW 511–39 (2d ed. 2005); CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY:  THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 61–88 (1994) (regard-
ing Bush 41); James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President:  An 
Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851 (2001) (Reagan through 
Clinton); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 533 (1989) (Reagan); Stephen Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking:  An 
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003) (Reagan through Clinton); Christo-
pher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986) (Reagan administration program); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (Clinton); Peter M. Shane, Political Account-
ability in a System of Checks and Balances:  The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995) (Clinton).  For discussion of cost-benefit analysis, see THOMAS O. 
MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY:  THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE 
FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE:  THE FUTURE 
OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002). 
 80 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified in 
scattered sections of 40 U.S.C., 44 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.). 
 81 OIRA’s website is http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/. 
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economic analysis gives it a deregulatory cast; and it improves rules at 
the margin rather than impelling large revisions of priorities and 
programs. 
By 2009, the legality of the program appears to be beyond serious 
question.  Presidents can cite their constitutional duty to assure the 
faithful execution of the laws and their explicit power to require opi-
nions from administrators.  The executive orders routinely contain a 
caveat that they command action only to the extent permitted by law, 
acknowledging that statutory limits to administrative discretion are 
controlling.  Overall, the program at least qualifies for Justice Robert 
Jackson’s “zone of twilight" of presidential power that is neither au-
thorized nor forbidden by pertinent constitutional and statutory pro-
visions.82  By now, there is a respectable argument that Congress has 
acquiesced in the program, which has operated in a roughly similar 
fashion under Presidents of both parties for almost thirty years. 
The executive order program reveals that the world of presiden-
tial supervision of agency action has evolved substantially since An-
drew Jackson confronted William Duane.  Today, instead of a clash of 
titans, we usually have friction between bureaucracies.  Even—or es-
pecially—in the modern world, there is reason to preserve a simple 
chain of command between the President and the administrators in 
whom statutory decisions rest, as a recent controversy reveals.  The 
second President Bush issued Executive Order No. 13,422, which 
both increased the gatekeeping role of the regulatory policy officers 
within the agencies who administer the executive order program, and 
appeared to detach them somewhat from supervision by the adminis-
trators.83  The ultimate risk was that discretion vested by statutes in 
the agencies would shift into the White House bureaucracy.84  Presi-
dent Obama rescinded this executive order soon after taking office,85 
and was right to do so.  The existence of these officers as contact 
points for both OIRA and other White House officers is beneficial, 
 
 82 BRUFF, supra note 18, at 108–09. 
 83 Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007).  See generally Michael Hissam, 
The Impact of Executive Order 13,422 on Presidential Oversight of Agency Administration, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1292 (2008) (analyzing the changes that Executive Order 13,422 
made and noting, among other observations, that under the order the White House will 
have a gatekeeper in each agency). 
 84 See President Bush’s recent amendments to Executive Order 12866:  Hearing on Exec. Order 13,422 
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the  H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 
110th Cong. 1–2 (2007) (statement of Peter L. Strauss, Betts Professor of Law, Columbia 
Law School) (expressing concern that Executive Order 13,422 changed the President’s 
role in regulatory planning from that of an overseer to that of a decisionmaker). 
 85 Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009). 
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but their subordination to the chain of command in their agency 
needed restoration to ensure that the entire agency’s point of view 
(including that of expert staff) would be considered in policymaking.  
Any agency’s disparate elements come together to form official policy 
only at the level of the administrator.  The opportunity to reach and 
state statutory policy is a prime responsibility of any agency head, and 
must not be diluted.  And if White House push comes to presidential 
shove, it is the administrator who should communicate the views of 
the staff to the chief executive. 
Recent Presidents have overlain the OIRA program with occa-
sional directives of their own to agencies to commence particular 
rulemakings.  President William Clinton personally announced that 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would regulate tobacco 
advertising to children, and took political credit for the final rule.86  
President George W. Bush issued some directives, with less publicity 
than his predecessor employed.  For example, he asked the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services to implement regulations on the pri-
vacy of medical records that had been inherited from the Clinton 
administration, but to recommend “appropriate modifications to the 
rule.”87  The agency complied without formally mentioning presiden-
tial participation in the change. 
The Bush administration also employed a new tool that was im-
plemented by OIRA, the “prompt letter.”  This was “a public request 
by OIRA, to a regulator, that a rulemaking be initiated or completed, 
that information relevant to a regulatory program be disclosed to the 
public, or that a piece of research or analysis relevant to rulemaking 
be conducted.”88  The letters were used in a variety of contexts, for 
example food labeling and workplace safety.  They were a salutary 
way for the administration to communicate priorities to the regula-
tors. 
In the first weeks of his presidency, Barack Obama issued a series 
of policy instructions to federal regulatory agencies.  Obama’s brief 
memoranda to the agencies were appropriately restrained.  In each 
case, he “requested” an agency to pursue a particular rulemaking un-
 
 86 Kagan, supra note 79, at 2282–83.  For critiques of the Clinton program, see Cynthia R. 
Farina, The Consent of the Governed:  Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 987 (1997); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965 
(1997). 
 87 Statement on Federal Regulations on Privacy of Medical Records, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOCS. 611–12 (Apr. 16, 2001).  The resulting regulation is at 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 
14, 2002). 
 88 John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
395, 460 (2008) (citations omitted). 
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der its statutes, but in no case did he direct any outcome for the 
agency to reach.  First, he asked the EPA to reconsider a Bush ad-
ministration denial of a requested waiver for California and other 
states that would have allowed state emission standards for new motor 
vehicles to be more stringent than federal standards.89  He also asked 
the Secretary of Transportation to speed the promulgation of new 
automobile fuel economy standards.90  And he requested the Secre-
tary of Energy to issue new appliance energy efficiency standards.91 
Specific directives, such as those by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and 
Obama, can overcome the ossification of rulemaking and galvanize 
agency action on particular topics.  They are a way for Presidents to 
cut through the complex web of relationships with public and private 
entities that any agency inhabits and give it a direction to follow.92  I 
think these directives are surely within presidential powers when they 
select priorities from the vast statutory menu and set a general policy 
direction.  Within our government, the President is in the unique po-
sition of ensuring that a “mass of legislation” be executed.93  Setting 
priorities for the executive branch and spurring new initiatives are 
core presidential responsibilities. 
There are, however, two legal risks to avoid.  Both of these risks 
have presented enduring problems for the executive order pro-
grams.94  First, a particular directive can induce a violation of statutory 
limits.  President Clinton’s tobacco initiative had exactly that effect.  
The FDA had long taken the view that it had no jurisdiction over to-
bacco.  Clinton impatiently overrode the FDA’s caution, and the Su-
preme Court struck down the regulation on the jurisdictional 
ground.95  Under its Chevron doctrine, the Court defers to agencies’ 
interpretations of their statutes unless they are contrary to clear statu-
tory limits or otherwise unreasonable.  In the tobacco case, the Court 
invoked the first exception.  In Massachusetts, the Court considered 
the President’s position to be both illegal and unreasonable.  Thus, in 
crafting their administrations’ legal policies, Presidents should also 
respect the knowledge and experience that agency lawyers possess. 
 
 89 State of California Request for Waiver Under 42 U.S.C. 7543(b), the Clean Air Act, 74 
Fed. Reg. 4905 (Jan. 28, 2009). 
 90 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 74 Fed. Reg. 4907 (Jan. 28, 2009). 
 91 Appliance Efficiency Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 6537 (Feb. 9, 2009). 
 92 For the complexities of these webs, see EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT:  RETHINKING 
POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE (2005). 
 93 The quotation is from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 688 (1952) 
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 94 See generally Bruff, supra note 79. 
 95 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
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The second legal risk is the dictation of policies that are not sup-
ported by the administrative records to which the government’s ex-
perts contribute.  Any final administrative implementation of a stat-
ute requires careful analysis of issues of fact, policy, and law, to which 
both staff experts and political appointees in the agencies can con-
tribute.  Short-circuiting that process can produce ill-considered or 
even illegal decisions.  Thus, dictating a particular agency action is 
fundamentally different from initiating a rulemaking process that will 
have a general direction but not a preordained outcome. 
There are also policy risks.  First, unless the President is quite 
sparing about the number of these directives he issues to a particular 
agency, the chronically underfunded regulatory agencies may find 
themselves overwhelmed, unable to meet their normal statutory re-
sponsibilities.96  Second, every presidential action carries various 
White House communications in its wake.  This followup activity can 
generate conflicting or incoherent commands to agencies. 
Whether or not the President becomes personally interested in a 
rulemaking, executive officers from the White House or from other 
agencies may offer their views.  Some of this activity occurs in routi-
nized forms of interagency review.  Ad hoc participation also occurs.  
For example, various White House officers have intervened sporadi-
cally in important rulemakings to inject their views outside the OIRA 
process.97  Therefore, a President who wishes to coordinate federal 
regulatory policy must first coordinate the activities of both his own 
staff and the heads of all the agencies. 
In modern times, Presidents oversee a White House bureaucracy 
of substantial proportions.  Recently, the Executive Office of the Pres-
ident has ranged from 1500–1900 persons, while the White House 
Office within it has had about 400–500 persons.98  Of course, these 
numbers do not count the cabinet departments and the various ex-
ecutive and independent agencies they regulate.  A President who 
wants to control the executive branch must first master his own staff, 
the cabinet, and a cloud of other regulators.  Clearly, the President 
 
 96 For a case involving delayed regulation due to many kinds of conflicting oversight, some 
of it from the executive branch, see Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 
143 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 97 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:  A 
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006) (reviewing 
White House contacts with the EPA by the Bush 41 and Clinton administrations). 
 98 See The American Presidency Project, Size of the Executive Office of the President 
(E.O.P.), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/eop.php; see also U.S. Office of Person-
nel Management, Federal Employment Statistics, http://www.opm.gov/feddata/
html/2008/november/table2.asp. 
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must set his own administrative priorities clearly before he can set an-
yone else’s. 
The creation of new White House officials carrying regulatory 
portfolios in the Obama administration is an attempt to provide 
overall coordination for policymaking.  Adding a new bureaucratic 
layer of “czars” does have the potential to bring interested agencies 
into agreement on overall policy and to assure presidential endorse-
ment of the choices made.  If these czars can coordinate both the 
agencies and other elements of the White House bureaucracy, then 
the President will need to control only the czars themselves.  Never-
theless there remain the legal and policy risks outlined above; these 
risks may be exacerbated by an added level of executive branch over-
sight.  Above all, the czars must leave the responsibility to make regu-
latory decisions where the statutes place it, in the agency heads. 
Since the job description for czar appears nowhere but in the 
President’s mind, there is a special opportunity to use these officers 
to improve the engagement of regulation with expertise.  An officer 
who lacks line responsibility for a particular statutory portfolio but 
who has the duty to coordinate policy broadly can seek input from a 
wide range of sources.  These can include experts of various kinds 
from inside and outside the government, without regard to the con-
straints that inhere in focused regulatory programs.  Since the czars 
are not likely to be experts themselves, however, it remains necessary 
to test the information and opinion that flows in.  The simple way to 
do that is to forward the material to the agency or agencies responsi-
ble for considering it in their programs. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For the President personally, my analysis suggests concentrating 
on a few critical tasks.  First, he should exercise his constitutional 
power of appointment to select regulatory officers who understand 
and appreciate the boundary between expertise and policy and the 
potential for valuable contributions across the boundary.  Second, he 
should free the government’s experts who are not in political posi-
tions to communicate their views on science and policy to Congress 
and the public generally.  Third, he should limit the number of 
prompting directives that he issues to regulators to a few crucial is-
sues for which new priorities need to be set.  Fourth, to coordinate 
federal policy he should focus on working with relatively few officers 
in sensitive positions—his czars, the senior White House staff, and the 
heads of rulemaking agencies.  A single person could do that much. 
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For me, the foregoing outline of basic supervisory relationships 
suffices to portray an executive branch that is unitary enough both to 
serve the apparent purposes of the Constitution and to promote the 
kind of dialogue between specialist and generalist that meets the na-
tion’s need for sound policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
